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Forecasting Crime? Algorithmic Prediction and the
Doctrine of Police Entrapment
Mathew Zaia*
It should be understood at the outset, that the object to be attained is the
prevention of crime. To this great end every effort of the police is to be
directed. The security of person and property . . . will thus be better
effected than by the detection and punishment of the offender after he has
succeeded in committing the crime.
- Commissioners of the Police, Scotland Yard, 18291

1. INTRODUCTION
As the Commissioners of Police in mid-19th century England illustrate above,
the prevention of crime is an inherent function of public policing. To carry out
their function of detecting and combating crime, police frequently endeavour to
locate and use new tools enabling them to pre-empt criminal activity. 2 Many
conceptual policing models that drive law enforcement’s focus have been
highlighted in scholarly literature: community, problem-oriented, CompStatdriven (short for computer statistics), harm-focused, and order maintenance
policing. Developments in modern technology provide additional tools, allowing
police forces to delve deeper into suspects’ behaviour and uncover previously
unknown patterns of information. Such developments have facilitated
paradigmatic shifts in public and private policing practices. As a result, police
may be more likely to overstep their legal and constitutional boundaries.
One example of such an overstep is police entrapment. The doctrine of
entrapment has been defined by judges, lawyers, and legal scholars as the
inducement of criminal activity that, without the interference of police, would
not have occurred.3 Entrapment cases may involve undercover police officers
encouraging vulnerable and marginalized persons to participate in criminal
activity. These covert practices risk inducing otherwise law-abiding citizens into
committing an offence. While concerns over entrapment are prevalent in Canada
*
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B.A. (Hons.), M.A., J.D. Candidate, Editor-in-Chief (English) of the Ottawa Law
Review. I wish to thank Professor Carissima Mathen for her incredibly helpful
supervision and mentorship; Professor Craig Forcese for his important comments and
feedback; and the late Professor Ian Kerr for inspiring me to explore artificial intelligence
and its place in law. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and should not
be attributed to the Ottawa Law Review.
Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2016), Chapter
2.
Ibid, see generally Chapter 1.
See Brendon Murphy & John Anderson, ‘‘After the Serpent Beguiled Me: Entrapment
and Sentencing in Australia and Canada” (2014) 39:2 Queen’s LJ 621.
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and the United States (US) as illustrated by the case of R. v. Nuttall,4 they also
exist in the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia.5 However, this paper primarily
focuses on entrapment in Canadian law.
The Supreme Court of Canada has said that police investigatory powers that
encourage or facilitate criminal behaviour are permissible only if law
enforcement has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaging in
criminal activity, or pursues an investigation in line with a bona fide inquiry.6
Such investigations are frequently predicated on anonymous tips received
through Crime Stoppers, 7 advisory letters from the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS),8 or other data that jumpstarts an investigation.9 In
the Nuttall case, a disclosure letter from CSIS helped advance the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) investigation.10 Today, new models such as
predictive policing11 (gathering data for generalized, geographic suspicion
centered on probability-based thinking) and intelligence-led policing 12
(engaging individuals with heightened levels of risk) are becoming more
commonplace. For such models to establish a reasonable suspicion or to
constitute a bona fide inquiry, a significant amount of reliable data is required.
This paper explores whether and to what extent developments in the area of
AI can legitimately inform the creation of reasonable suspicions and bona fide
inquiries in the Canadian entrapment context. The paper aims to fill a gap in
Canadian entrapment scholarship, which has not focused on the possible impacts
that predictive technologies may have on the contours of the doctrine. 13 It argues
that due to a number of factors, including their lack of transparency, predictive
4
5

6

7

8

9
10
11

12

13

2018 BCCA 479, 2018 CarswellBC 3405 (B.C. C.A.) [Nuttall].
See R. v. Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11, 2020 CarswellOnt 7387, 2020 CarswellOnt 7388 (S.C.C.)
[Ahmad] at paras 150-153 (dissenting).
Ibid; R. v. Mack, 1988 CarswellBC 701, 1988 CarswellBC 767, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903
(S.C.C.) [Mack].
See R. v. Le, 2016 BCCA 155, 2016 CarswellBC 947 (B.C. C.A.), leave to appeal refused
2016 CarswellBC 3004, 2016 CarswellBC 3005 (S.C.C.). For an explanation of and
further research on Crime Stoppers, see Randy K Lippert and Kevin Walby, ‘‘Funnelling
Through Foundations and Crime Stoppers: How Public Police Create and Span InterOrganisational Boundaries” (2017) 27:6 Policing <char style=’“amp”> Society 602.
Craig Forcese & Kent Roach, False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian AntiTerrorism (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 116.
Ibid at 118.
See Nuttall, supra note 4 at para 20.
For a detailed description of predictive policing, see generally Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, ‘‘Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion” (2012) 62 Emory LJ 259.
For a detailed description of intelligence-led policing, see generally United States of
America, US Department of Justice, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence
Architecture, NCJ 210681 (Washington: International Association of Chiefs of Police,
2005).
However, one article in the US examined the impact of predictive policing on reasonable
suspicions to strictly stop and search: Ferguson, supra note 11.
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technologies present difficult challenges for officers of the court and weaken the
accused’s ability to argue entrapment. The paper suggests that if predictive
technologies become more prevalent, the doctrine of entrapment must be
revisited.
Exploring how predictability affects the doctrine of entrapment in Canada is
important because police entrapment often occurs in respect of serious offences
including but not limited to terrorism and drug trafficking.14 The jeopardy for
accused persons is typically high in entrapment cases. The reliability of predictive
technologies bears directly on individuals’ liberty; any inaccuracy could lead to
an abuse of process given that individuals’ decision-making would be influenced
by inaccurate data or predictions. If predictive technologies are adopted more
commonly in Canada, exploring their impacts on entrapment would allow
legislatures and courts to prepare themselves for responding to emerging cases
dealing with entrapment.
Section two of this paper discusses the Canadian doctrine of entrapment.
Section three lists and describes contemporary predictive policing technologies. It
additionally considers different policing models that deal with prediction. Section
four addresses the reliability of predictive technology and the issues that come
with using certain data. In the fifth section, the relationship between predictive
technologies and entrapment law is explored. The paper concludes with
observations on the challenges and opportunities of such technologies for
entrapment cases. Although predictive technologies can be useful, their place in
entrapment law complicates things for the existing entrapment framework and
many associated stakeholders. As such, the paper’s conclusion also offers general
recommendations for how Canadian courts might grapple with the AIentrapment relationship in legal matters before them.

2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ENTRAPMENT
Courts can expand or inhibit police investigatory powers. The Supreme
Court of Canada is seen as the guardian of police powers, as it has both enabled
and limited their development.15 Beginning in the 1980s in R. v. Amato,16 the
Supreme Court developed the pre-existing17 doctrine of police entrapment with a
14

15

16

For example, a terrorism-related conviction may include a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s. 83.22(1); those merely accused of
terrorist activity (without being convicted) may also be subject to terrorism peace bonds
with restrictive conditions pursuant to section 810.011 of the Code.
Richard Jochelson & Mark Doerkson, ‘‘The Supreme Court of Canada Presents: The
Surveillant Charter and the Judicial Creation of Police Powers in Canada” in Randy K
Lippert et al, eds, National Security, Surveillance and Terror: Canada and Australia in
Comparative Perspective (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 75.
1982 CarswellBC 661, 1982 CarswellBC 739, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.); in the 1970s,
scholars suggested that entrapment was not defined in Canada other than comments in
obiter: see Joel Shafer & William J Sheridan, ‘‘The Defence of Entrapment” (1970) 8:2
Osgoode Hall LJ 277.
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view to revolutionizing its treatment. As an extension of the abuse of process
doctrine in the common law, entrapment is used in Canada to ensure that public
police officers do not ‘‘transgress the very laws that they are entrusted to
enforce.”18 In other words, the courts employ the doctrine to limit the state’s
power in police investigations and ‘‘protect against overreaching and
discriminatory policing.”19
When police entrap an individual, they induce the individual into committing
an offence they otherwise would not have committed.20 Defence counsel can
present entrapment after the Crown has proven the offence beyond a reasonable
doubt,21 and the burden of proof lies with the accused on a balance of
probabilities.22 Thereafter, the trial judge (juries play no role in Canada) must
assess the claim. If the offender is found to have been entrapped by law
enforcement, a stay of proceedings is issued on the basis of abuse of process.
Entrapment thus differentiates itself from traditional defences for two reasons: it
does not negate any element of the offence, and the entrapped individual is not
acquitted.23
Despite police stings24 and entrapment being featured more in the US than in
Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada in the late 20th century took its own path
regarding the law of entrapment and proceeded in a different legal direction.
Writing for the majority in Mack, Justice Lamer (as he then was) carved out an
assessment of the doctrine focusing on state action. There are two ways
entrapment can be established in Canada:
(a) the authorities provide a person with an opportunity to commit an
offence without acting [i] on a reasonable suspicion that this

17

18

19

20
21

22
23
24

It existed in the English common law but was not ‘‘developed as a defence in its own
right”: ibid at 278. As such, the doctrine is pre-existing insofar as it was inherited from
English common law. See also Steven Penney, ‘‘Entrapment Minimalism: Shedding the
‘No Reasonable Suspicion or Bona Fide Inquiry’ Test” (2019) 44:2 Queen’s LJ 356.
Allan Hutchinson & Neil R Withington, Comments, ‘‘Criminal Law — Evidence —
Defence of Entrapment — Discretion to Exclude Evidence” (1980) 58 Can Bar Rev 376
at 376.
David M Tanovich, ‘‘Rethinking the Bona Fides of Entrapment” (2011) 43:2 UBC L Rev
417 at 418.
See Murphy & Anderson, supra note 3.
See Matthew Asma & Matthew Gourlay, Charter Remedies in Criminal Cases: A
Practitioner’s Handbook (Emond, 2018).
See R. v. Swan, 2009 BCCA 142, 2009 CarswellBC 798 (B.C. C.A.).
See Asma & Gourlay, supra note 21.
In exploring terrorism-related allegations of entrapment in several countries, Norris
found that only four Canadian police stings (.11 per capita) were undertaken, while 156
US police stings (.48 per capita) were undertaken: see Jesse J Norris, ‘‘Another Form of
American Exceptionalism? A Comparative Analysis of Terrorism Sting Operations in
the US and Abroad” (2019) Terrorism & Political Violence, DOI: https:/doi.org/
10.1080/09546553.2019.1613984.
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person is already engaged in criminal activity or [ii] pursuant to a
bona fide inquiry;
(b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or acting in the
course of a bona fide inquiry, they go beyond providing an
opportunity and induce the commission of an offence.25

Unlike the US’s subjective, culpability-based model that assesses whether the
accused was already predisposed to commit an offence,26 the Supreme Court’s
objective method is confined to strictly considering the state’s conduct. 27 As
exhibited above, authorities’ actions are central to an objective assessment.
However, the accused’s predisposition is not completely irrelevant to Canadian
courts. To the contrary, an accused’s predisposition and previous conduct
becomes germane in judicial assessments of reasonable suspicions discussed
below. As this paper will elaborate, the relationship between predisposition and
reasonable suspicions is crucial in the realm of algorithmic predictions; it may
facilitate predispositions forming part of the equation for reasonable suspicions.
The technicalities of inducing the commission of an offence (part b of the
entrapment test) extend beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, it is worth
mentioning that without a reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry, officers
are still able to engage in ‘‘extensive discussions” with an individual ‘‘so long as
they do not provide the suspect a formal opportunity to commit an offence.” 28 In
such cases, they are not said to be inducing the commission of an offence. With
that in mind, reasonable suspicions and bona fide inquiries are discussed in turn.

2.1 Reasonable Suspicions
When undertaking actions that would ordinarily infringe the rights of
individuals, such as detaining, arresting, or searching them, police must meet
certain legal thresholds. Originating in English law,29 reasonable suspicions are
on the lower end of the investigative threshold spectrum; they are more
demanding than mere suspicions but less so than beliefs based on reasonable and
probable grounds.30 In R. v. Chehil, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that
25

26

27
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29

R v. Seymour, 2016 MBCA 118 at para 6. In Ahmad, supra note 5, the Supreme
Court affirmed both prongs of the test introduced in Mack.
The subjective approach used in the US requires counsel to prove two elements, namely
that the accused was predisposed to committing the given offence and law enforcement
ultimately induced the commission of the offence: see Mack, supra note 6 at para 42.
Mack, supra note 6 at para 110.
Kent Roach, ‘‘Be Careful what you Wish for? Terrorism Prosecutions in Post-9/11
Canada” (2014) 40:1 Queen’s LJ 99 at 121, referring to a case where the offender was not
granted the entrapment defence despite an extensive police sting operation absent
reasonable suspicion: R. v. Hersi, 2014 ONSC 4143, 2014 CarswellOnt 10303 (Ont.
S.C.J.).
See Terry Skolnik, ‘‘The Suspicious Distinction Between Reasonable Suspicion and
Reasonable Grounds to Believe” (2016) 47:1 Ottawa L Rev 223.
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reasonable suspicions engage possibility-type assessments, whereas beliefs based
on reasonable and probable grounds involve probability-type measurements.31
What enables a mere suspicion to become reasonable is its grounding in
‘‘objectively discernible facts”32 rather than subjective beliefs or hunches.33 These
must include ‘‘concrete and specific information supporting [police’s] belief that
the search will uncover evidence of criminal activity.”34
The reasonable suspicion threshold avoids what courts call random virtuetesting, a police scheme that risks ‘‘attracting innocent and otherwise law-abiding
individuals into the commission of a criminal offence.”35 Random virtue-testing
often occurs in cases concerning different types of trafficking 36 or child-luring37
offences. In simple terms, random virtue-testing involves officers attempting to
incriminate an individual on mere subjective hunches rather than grounds of
reasonable suspicion. Thus, to circumvent a charge of entrapment reasonable
suspicions must be developed ex ante by police.38
The significance of reasonable suspicions with respect to entrapment is
illustrated in numerous cases. In R. v. Abdelhaleem, the accused — associated
with the ‘‘Toronto 18”39 — was convicted for sections 83.18(1) and 83.2 Criminal
Code terrorism offences. Thereafter, he claimed that he was entrapped by CSIS
30

31
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35
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38
39

See R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008 CarswellAlta 523, 2008 CarswellAlta 524, 2008 SCC 18,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) at para 75 [Kang-Brown].
See R. v. Chehil, 2013 CarswellNS 693, 2013 CarswellNS 694, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3
S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.) at para 27 [Chehil]; but see generally Skolnik, supra note 29 where the
author argues that probability logically cannot be overlooked when thinking of
reasonable suspicions; possibility is inherently probabilistic.
R. v. Mann, 2004 CarswellMan 303, 2004 CarswellMan 304, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.)
at para 27 [Mann]; see also Simon Stern, ‘‘Textual Privacy and Mobile Information”,
(2018) 13:17 Osgoode Hall LJ 1; however, ‘‘less reliable information could justify
reasonable suspicion, though not reasonable grounds to believe”: Skolnik, supra note 29
at 235.
See Kang-Brown, supra note 30.
See also Steven Penney, ‘‘Unreasonable Search and Seizure and Section 8 of the Charter:
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Constitutional Interpretation” in Errol Mendes & Stéphane
Beaulac, eds, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed (Toronto: Lexis, 2013) at
42.
Mack, supra note 6 at para 115.
See generally Supra, note 25 for entrapment in a weapons trafficking case.
See Brent Kettles, ‘‘The Entrapment Defence in Internet Child Luring Cases” (2011) 16:1
Can Crim L Rev 89.
See Asma & Gourlay, supra note 21.
The Toronto 18 involved a ‘‘group of 18 individuals who were planning a series of attacks
in the province of Ontario and were subsequently arrested in June 2006. [. . .] Today, with
the release of court records, and a number of successful prosecutions, what is clear is that
some group members had the ambition, the will, and arguably the capacity to carry out a
spectacular bomb attack in Canada’s most populous metropolitan area”: John McCoy &
W Andy Knight, ‘‘Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends”
(2015) 38:4 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 253 at 262—263.
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and the RCMP. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected his argument and
held that law enforcement had reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr.
Abdelhaleem was engaged in terrorist activity.40

2.2 Bona Fide Inquiries
Reasonable suspicions are generally focused on particular individuals
thought to be engaging in criminal activity. Police investigations can also be
undertaken pursuant to a bona fide inquiry, where officers become aware of
criminal activity occurring in a certain location. For example, if criminal activity
exists in a particular area, officers can present opportunities to individuals in the
area to commit an offence. One can observe and liken these investigations to be
grounded in reasonable suspicions of crime likely occurring in a given area. 41
Investigations pursuant to a bona fide inquiry do not raise concerns about
random virtue-testing. Areas said to be home to criminal activity expose any
individual in said area to possible police investigation. Chief Justice Lamer,
writing for the majority in R. v. Barnes, commented on this police power:
When such a location is defined with sufficient precision, the police may
present any person associated with the area with the opportunity to
commit the particular offence. . . Such randomness is permissible within
the scope of a bona fide inquiry.42

The rise of technology complicates these sorts of investigations. In Ahmad,
the accused was subject to a ‘‘dial-a-dope” investigation where the Toronto
Police Service received credible information regarding an individual selling drugs
by way of telephone.43 The pertinent question was whether bona fide inquiries
applied beyond physical areas to virtual things like phone numbers. The Supreme
Court affirmed that the test in Mack applied to virtual spaces. The majority (5-4)
of the Court emphasized that ‘‘police must have reasonable suspicion over an
individual or a well-defined virtual space, like a phone number, before providing
an opportunity to commit a crime.”44 Writing for four dissenting judges, Justice
Moldaver concluded that the bona fide inquiry prong of the Mack test required
revision so as ‘‘to preserve the fundamental balance struck in Mack and Barnes
between protecting individual liberties and fostering effective law enforcement
while also bringing the doctrine in line with the realities of the digital age.” 45
40
41

42
43
44

See R. v. Abdelhaleem, 2010 CarswellOnt 9938, [2010] O.J. No. 5693 (Ont. S.C.J.).
See R. v. Barnes, 1991 CarswellBC 915, 1991 CarswellBC 11, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 449 (S.C.C.)
[Barnes]. In Barnes, one of the questions put to the Court was whether the police had a
reasonable suspicion about criminal activity occurring in a given area so as to present the
accused with an opportunity to commit a crime. The Court found that the investigating
officer’s suspicion was instead based on a hunch.
Ibid at 463 [emphasis in original].
Ahmad, supra note 5.
Ibid at para 40 [emphasis added]. In essence, the Court held that bona fide inquiries are
not limited to physical spaces and extend into the digital world.
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To summarize, in Mack, the Supreme Court provided two ways — in
addition to inducement — whereby police can avoid entrapment: establishing
reasonable grounds to suspect or investigating pursuant to a bona fide inquiry.
Employed to avoid practices like random virtue-testing, maintain the function of
the criminal justice system, and limit state power, these precursors to permissible
police investigations have been stagnant for many years. Regarding the
expansion of bona fide inquiries, Ahmad presents new challenges to the law of
entrapment due to the use of technology, but it affirms the test provided in
Mack. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s split decision demonstrates such challenges.
It sheds light on how expanding entrapment into the digital sphere may present
issues with which courts may have to grapple.

3. POLICING AND VIRTUAL PREDICTIONS
The police have a number of tools enabling their reactive practices including
apprehending suspects, questioning appropriate witnesses, and collecting
relevant evidence. For many years, the concept of reaction served as the
nucleus to police action; everything done by police served a reactive purpose. 46
Viewed in this light, law enforcement had three functions: ‘‘routine patrol,
immediate response to calls, and follow-up investigations.”47 The use of
analytical tools at law enforcement’s disposal shifts conventional policing
toward a preventative, proactive approach. Two models have dominated
discourse surrounding these expanding proactive police practices: intelligenceled and predictive policing.
This section outlines those two models. After providing a brief overview of
both intelligence-led and predictive policing (3.1), the section refers to specific
programs that use AI to aid their predictions (3.2). It does not seek to catalogue a
comprehensive list of current policing models and programs. Instead, it intends
to shed light on predictive technologies with a view to assessing how reasonable
suspicions and bona fide inquiries in the entrapment doctrine are affected. To
address predictive technologies, one must highlight the concept of data.

3.1 Monitoring, Collecting, and Analyzing Data
As consumers, our everyday lives are loaded with smart technology and data:
devices that feature biometric capabilities; 48 fitness trackers that measure health
conditions; and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter that use AI
to predict individual likes and dislikes.49 The growth in technology usage
45
46

47

48

Ibid at para 186 (dissenting).
See Jan Scott, ‘‘‘Performance Culture’: The Return of Reactive Policing” (1998) 8:3
Policing & Society 269.
Department of Justice, ‘‘Police Discretion with Young Offenders”, Government of
Canada (7 January 2015), online: <www.justice.gc.ca>.
See Shoshana Magnet, When Biometrics Fail: Gender, Race, and the Technology of
Identity (Duke University Press, 2011).

ALGORITHMIC PREDICTION AND POLICE ENTRAPMENT

263

produces a vast supply of data about billions of individuals. Some liken data to
the ‘‘new oil” given the extent to which it features in sophisticated commercial
transactions.50 Indeed, the benefits of technology enable consistent data
movement and transactions.51
There has also been a growth of surveillance by governments, private
corporations, and individuals alike, all of which correspond to decreasing levels
of personal privacy. Governments use technology to oversee and understand
populations; private corporations like Amazon surveil and create products that
enable citizens to surveil one another.52 As a result, ‘‘[l]ess and less escapes the
surveillant eye.”53
Mass surveillance practices allow the collection of data that is useful for AI
and algorithms for a variety of purposes, including administrative decisionmaking.54 A key example is the criminal justice system. In the US, a program
called COMPAS uses historical data to assess levels of risk that individuals pose
for recidivism. In the UK, some police forces use a ‘‘Harm Assessment Risk
Tool” (Hart) to forecast individual propensity to commit offences. 55 A similar
tool is used in Australia, where police employ a ‘‘Suspect Targeting Management
Plan” (STMP) to measure whether children as young as 11-years old are likely to
offend. There are many other examples of predictive analytics in the justice
system.56
Data-monitoring tools are in a constant state of flux. After complementing
traditional surveillance practices, such as the population census, for many years,
contemporary surveillance techniques now transcend them. Mark Andrejevic
notes that ‘‘[a]t no previous time in human history has so much information been
captured, stored, and sorted.”57 The vast quantity of data that is captured by and
makes its way through ‘‘surveillance assemblages”58 is often referred to as ‘‘big
49

50

51

52

53
54

55

56

See Raghav Bharadwaj, ‘‘AI for Social Media Censorship — How it Works at Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter” Emerj (10 February 2019), online: <www.emerj.com>.
Ramona Pringle, ‘‘‘Data is the New Oil’: Your Personal Information is Now the World’s
Most Valuable Commodity”, CBC (25 August 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
See Bernard Harcourt, Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (Harvard
University Press, 2015).
See Mathew Zaia, ‘‘Exploring Consciousness: The Online Community’s Understanding
of Mobile Technology Surveillance” (2019) 17:3/4 Surveillance & Society 533.
David Lyon, The Culture of Surveillance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018) at 35.
See Jesse Beatson, ‘‘AI-Supported Adjudicators: Should Artificial Intelligence Have a
Role in Tribunal Adjudication?” (2018) 31 Can J Admin L & Prac 307.
Sarah Marsh, ‘‘UK Police use of Computer Programs to Predict Crime Sparks
Discrimination Warning”, The Guardian (3 February 2019), online: <www.theguardian.com/uk>.
For example, the Law Commission of Ontario suggests that automated decision-making
is being used ‘‘in areas as diverse as immigration and refugee proceedings, police
profiling, and to determine sentencing, bail and parole conditions”: Law Commission of
Ontario, ‘‘Automated Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System” (22 March
2019), online: <www.lco-cdo.org>.
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data.”59 These bodies of data are recognized by virtue of their volume, velocity,
and variety,60 as they enable storage and analysis through ‘‘datafication.”61 Used
for various purposes, big data often carries data about data62 and is regularly
bought and sold.
Big data is compiled — often by consent to terms and conditions — from
users or consumers of technology; this includes smartphone applications for
social media, or food delivery and travel applications.63 Some suggest that data
are given willingly due to consumer trust in companies, 64 while others argue that
the convenience and capacities of technology override individual protection of
personal data.65 Other data-gathering technologies include those to which
consumers do not necessarily voluntarily subject themselves, some of which

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

Mark Andrejevic, ‘‘Automating Surveillance” (2019) 17:1/2 Surveillance & Society 7 at
7.
See Kevin D Haggerty & Richard V Ericson, ‘‘The Surveillant Assemblage” (2000) 51:4
Brit J Soc 605.
For an introduction to big data, see Mark Andrejevic & Kelly Gates, ‘‘Big Data
Surveillance: An Introduction” (2014) 12:2 Surveillance & Society 185.
See Edd Dumbill, ‘‘Volume, Velocity, Variety: What You Need to Know About Big
Data”, Forbes (19 January 2012), online: <www.forbes.com>.
See Jose van Dijck, ‘‘Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data Between
Scientific Paradigm and Ideology” (2014) 12:2 Surveillance & Society 197.
This is otherwise known as ‘‘metadata.” The former Privacy Commissioner of Ontario
defined metadata as ‘‘information generated by our communications devices and our
communications service providers, as we use technologies like landline telephones,
mobile phones, desktop computers, laptops, tablets or other computing devices”: see
Craig Forcese, ‘‘One Warrant to Rule Them All: Reconsidering the Judicialisation of
Extraterritorial Intelligence Collection” in Randy K Lippert et al, eds, National Security,
Surveillance and Terror: Canada and Australia in Comparative Perspective (Cham:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 27 at 34, citing Ann Cavoukian, ‘‘A Primer on Metadata:
Separating Fact from Fiction” (2013) Ontario: Information and Privacy Commissioner,
July. According to Justice Simon Noël of the Federal Court, ‘‘[m]etadata, on its own and
processed through aggregation and analysis, can provide intimate insights into the
lifestyle and personal choices of individuals; it is not an innocuous kernel of
information”: see John Paul Tasker, ‘‘What You Need to Know About the CSIS
Metadata Ruling,” CBC News (4 November 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca>.
The legal scholar Bernard Harcourt calls the current surveillance society — one where
consumers willingly expose themselves — the ‘‘expository society.” For a theoretical
discussion about the expository society, see generally Bernard Harcourt, ‘‘Digital
Security in the Expository Society: Spectacle, Surveillance, and Exhibition in the
Neoliberal Age of Big Data” (2014) Columbia Public Law Research Paper No 14-404.
Fen Osler Hampson & Eric Jardine, Look Who’s Watching: Surveillance, Treachery and
Trust Online (Waterloo: CIGI Press, 2016).
For example, see Emily West, ‘‘Amazon: Surveillance as a Service” (2019) 12:1/2
Surveillance & Society 27 for a discussion about how Amazon’s surveillance suggests
that North American populations have normalized surveillance for individual, beneficial
purposes.
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include automated license-plate readers,66 police body cameras,67 and airport
biometric surveillance.68
The prevalence of these data requires ever-more efficient ways to analyze
them. At the forefront of the analysis is AI, which not only provides enhanced
capabilities, but in many cases learns new ways to undertake such functions. 69
Technologies with AI capabilities — such as robots — are being introduced in a
number of industries. Indeed, AI is now permeating the confines of homes by
way of machines such as Google Home and Amazon Alexa.70 However, AI is
inoperable without constant data input for processing and analysis.
Police forces are now using AI and algorithmic technologies to carry out
their law enforcement functions.71 These technologies draw data from a number
of sources, including conventional crime reports containing suspect, offender,
victim, and geographic data. As administrative decision-making tools, they must
be consistent with principles of legality, transparency, justice, and fairness.
Contemporary policing technologies also aid these algorithms. For example,
police body cameras often carry biometric data, and ‘‘Stingrays” are able to
collect data from network-connected devices in a given geographic area. Scholars
note that ‘‘intelligence gathering has become one of the most strategic processes
of surveillance.”72 These data are essential to modern policing functions,
especially where prediction is at play.
The more common these policing tools become, the more challenges they
present. COMPAS, for example, relies on controversial factors such as parental
criminality, which can be distorted by previous bias and discrimination in
policing.73 And yet, the algorithm is used by the judiciary to determine
sentencing options for convicted persons.74 The Australian Youth Justice
66
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other negative practices.
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Coalition suggests that those who are flagged by the STMP ‘‘experience a pattern
of constant harassment by police”.75 It states that the STMP can have an adverse
discriminatory effect on Indigenous Australians.
Beyond algorithmic prediction’s minor presence in contemporary Canadian
policing, it is likely that Canadian police services will predominantly base future
investigations on some combination of algorithmic predictions using AI. 76 If so,
a ‘‘reasonable” suspicion in the context of entrapment may turn out to be
‘‘virtual”, informed by predictive technologies. If sufficiently widespread, such
virtual suspicions could permit police to circumvent the strictures of current
entrapment law.

3.2 Intelligence-Led and Predictive Policing
For approximately two decades, intelligence-led and predictive methods have
dominated policing discourse. Intelligence-led policing began being used in the
late 20th and early 21st centuries. In Canada, the RCMP adopted intelligence-led
policing so as to advance beyond community policing models. 77 Despite AI not
being as popular in early 21st century policing, intelligence itself was devised by
individual officers from everyday police-gathered information. This intelligence
was used, along with other problem-solving tools, to ‘‘target groups and
individuals involved in serious organized crime or terrorism.” 78
Public Safety Canada defines intelligence-led policing as a way for ‘‘police to
identify individuals at high risk and geographic areas of high risk. With this
knowledge, police resources are utilized more effectively and efficiently to
proactively respond to criminal activity.” 79 Intelligence-led policing was
formulated to redirect policing toward proactive measures.80 Engaging both
quantitative and qualitative analysis, intelligence-led policing:
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Public Safety Canada, ‘‘Intelligence-Led Policing (Details)”, Government of Canada (1
August 2013), online: <www.publicsafety.gc.ca>.
See Ratcliffe, supra note 1, Chapter 2.
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is designed to be a model for the business of policing; aims to achieve
crime and harm reduction, prevention and disruption; focuses on [. . .]
prolific offenders, repeat victims and active criminal groups; employs a
top-down management approach; merges crime analysis and criminal
intelligence; [and] aids police resource prioritization.81

Some observe that the model now uses ‘‘biometric and drone technologies”
while also amassing ‘‘data generated through the use of social media.”82 Most
recently, scholars have noted that the model requires accumulating information
from many sources, ‘‘including surveillance, informants and other agencies, to
target habitual offenders and gain crime reduction efficiencies.”83 In Canada, the
enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 broadened and facilitated such
intelligence-led policing powers.84
Predictive policing has similar premises but is ‘‘[r]egarded as a refinement of
‘intelligence-led policing’.”85 It has been described as:
[T]he use of historical data to create a forecast of areas of criminality or
crime hot spots, or high-risk offender characteristic profiles that will be
one component of police resource allocation decisions. The resources
will be allocated with the expectation that, with targeted deployment,
criminal activity can be prevented, reduced, or disrupted.86

Predictive policing models currently utilize advanced analytics by way of
machine learning and other AI to predict areas that are or will be fraught with
criminal activity.87 The non-profit RAND Corporation suggests that predictive
policing is also attentive to particular individuals and their propensity to commit
crime.88
In addition to data-mining methods, the model uses historical criminal data
to pre-empt crime.89 These methods include ‘‘algorithms to estimate a
probability of future criminality at places or among high-risk people.” 90
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Enforcement Operations” (2013) RAND Corporation.
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Recent developments in predictive policing highlight the model’s ability to use
‘‘all kinds of societal data and variables”91 to help facilitate more accurate
results.
Predictive policing inherently consists of intelligence-led policing qualities,
and the inverse is also apparent. It would be difficult for law enforcement to use
raw data alone to fashion predictions. Data must be analyzed (by humans or
machines) to produce intelligence which can inform police predictions. By
definition, this policing strategy is intelligence-led.92 Similarly, intelligence-led
policing engages proactive policing by means of prediction using intelligence,
ultimately allowing law enforcement to anticipate which areas and people require
attention rather than remain reactive. Therefore, in the rest of the paper reference
to both models will be made using the term ‘‘predictive policing” to capture the
notion of police attempts to predict and prevent criminal activity using artificial
intelligence and algorithms. The technicalities of the two terms for the purposes
of this paper are not as important as highlighting law enforcement’s predictive
capabilities and how that influences the doctrine of entrapment.
Indeed, AI allows predictive policing to function more efficiently. The vast
amount of data available to police departments93 necessitates the use of machine
analysis, as analysis by humans would be too cumbersome. Using AI helps locate
‘‘behavioural patterns and create a method for the sharing of data in the fight
against crime.”94 Algorithms facilitate an easier approach to prediction than
methods such as hands-on traditional geographic mapping.95 These systems
already exist in a number of police departments, as the following examples
demonstrate.
PredPol (short for predictive policing) is used by 50 US police forces.
One of the most popular predictive programs, PredPol uses similar
‘‘models that predict earthquake aftershocks”96 to predict criminality.
The company running and distributing the program suggests that its
90
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algorithms can improve crime detection by up to 50 percent. The
program relies on historic criminal data, including locations of crime,
timing of crime, and type of crime, combined with ‘‘other socioeconomic data.”97 Its creators claim that PredPol can discern criminal
hot spots over a range of up to 150 square-meters.98
LASER (also known as ‘‘operation LASER”), used in the US, is a bit
more dated, originating in 2011. LASER program is assisted by a
private corporation, Palantir, which provides technology that enables
law enforcement to score individuals. A higher number of points forces
individuals onto a ‘‘Chronic Offender Bulletin” on which police focus
much of their efforts.99
HunchLab is a more limited program that focuses its efforts on
particular kinds of crime, as it predicts ‘‘genuinely new risk patterns for
certain areas.”100 This program is unique insofar as it uses ‘‘data about
[social] infrastructure” in addition to ‘‘imaginative rationales of big
data mining in policing” to manufacture predictions. Indeed, it is
reasonable to assume that the implementation of smart cities would
therefore develop HunchLab’s capabilities and performativity.
National Data Analytics Solution (NDAS) is a software that has made
headlines in recent months. Based in the UK, NDAS is currently being
developed by the West Midlands Police following a year of previous
testing.101 This program seeks to discern ‘‘where crime will be
committed and by whom.”102 However, current reports suggest that
NDAS leads are ensuring that the project is subject to independent
review for ethical purposes.
Visual Analytics for Sense-making in Criminal Intelligence Analysis
(VALCRI) is another project based in the UK that seeks to use
machine learning to predict timeslots and areas with higher crime
trends and patrol needs.103 The program is said to use ‘‘anonymous
criminal records, whilst also pulling in data from a range of other
97
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sources to provide analysts with insight” regarding police detective
work and possibly patterns in crime detection.104

Predictive policing practices have also entered Canada. In Vancouver, police
have taken the next step: using spatial analytics and machine learning to predict
crime over a 100-meter radius.105 Alleged to be accurate over 80 percent of the
time, the algorithms target locations for upcoming criminal activity within a oneto five-hour timespan.106
Most, but not all, predictive policing programs use data available exclusively
to police. These data include crime reports and tips of alleged or possible
criminal activity. For example, the Ottawa Police Strategic Operations Centre
(OPSOC) gathers data from crime reports, floor plans in public buildings, and
social media to ‘‘provide frontline officers with crime statistics and predictive
analytics.”107 It is not clear, however, whether these are the only data inputted
into algorithms. One researcher suggests that social media and other data (e.g.
VALCRI program above) being used by police departments is imminent, as ‘‘this
is already happening” in ‘‘places such as Vancouver and Toronto.”108 For
example, there exists the possibility of fourth-party corporations being useful to
state data collection109 according to the following logic: user ‘‘1” submits data to
entity ‘‘2”, which then sells 1’s data to corporation ‘‘3”, who has contractual
obligations to release such data to ‘‘4”. If, for example, ‘‘4” is willing to provide
this information to state agencies at a payable rate, some wonder whether law
enforcement might be able to use such data as part of their predictive programs.

3.3 Smart Cities
In 2009, a federally funded US report suggested that city or neighbourhood
planning (such as the design of spaces or police resource allocation) would be
considered for future predictive policing.110 Now, smart cities are increasingly
featured in North America; that 66 percent of American cities are engaging with
smart cities reveals their popularity.111 Smart cities exhibit an interplay between
104
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private and public sectors using communication technologies and data
governance in a city’s infrastructure.112 Viewed from different perspectives, the
advanced cities are and can be used for a number of underlying purposes, one of
which involves:
[P]ervasive and ubiquitous computing and digitally instrumented
devices built into the very fabric of urban environments [. . .] that are
used to monitor, manage and regulate city flows and processes, often in
real-time, and mobile computing [. . .] used by many urban citizens to
engage with and navigate the city which themselves produce data about
their users.113

Monitoring, managing, and regulating are done through both pre-existing
and novel urban technologies, including self-driving shuttle busses, 114 drones
engaging in fast-food delivery,115 and smart energy, infrastructure, and
mobility.116 The core of smart city technology is its ability to produce valuable
data. Scholars have observed that ownership of this data is shared by a number
of parties, including the municipality where the technologies are utilized. 117
In 2017, the Government of Canada encouraged the implementation of
smart cities by announcing its first Smart Cities Challenge. 118 The competition
‘‘empower[ed] communities to adopt a smart cities approach” for various
purposes.119 The process involved several municipalities submitting proposals for
their own smart city visions. For example, the winner of the grand prize ($50
million CAD) detailed a list of elements that were central to its proposal,
including engagement and mobilization efforts, collaborative governance, and an
impact measurement approach.120 Showing enthusiasm to smarten their cities,
many other municipalities also submitted proposals.
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Among Canada’s proposed smart cities, the City of Toronto’s partnership
with Sidewalk Labs — a member of the tech giant Google family121 — has made
headlines. One panel of experts in Toronto recently questioned the ownership of
the produced data.122 The Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner had
suggested that plans to substantiate data privacy for the Sidewalk Labs project
were problematic.123 The Commissioner called for the provincial legislature to
address gaps in privacy legislation before commencing the smart city project 124
which was ultimately cancelled.
As sensors and other gadgets permeate the walls of Canadian cities, they will
necessarily extend law enforcement’s predictive arm. Important questions that
remain unanswered include but are not restricted to which public or private
bodies will retain the data and for how long, how the data will be stored and
protected, and how transparency will work with respect to processes and
purposes of data collection.
If municipal, provincial, or federal police agencies are able to access and use
smart city data, their algorithmic predictions will be polished, and their ability to
cross-reference existing data will presumably be enriched. A simple example
involves the possibility of ubiquitous wireless internet, 125 which could be
complemented by, for example, Stingrays for cross-network data collection.
Ultimately, using a Stingray would allow the agency operating the device to
intercept network communications.126 The ability to obtain data from a smart
city filled with technology may therefore ‘‘be of potential value in a criminal
investigation or to prevent crime from occurring in the first place.” 127

3.4 Data Reliability, Sufficiency, and Accuracy
As mentioned earlier in this paper, predictive tools are only as accurate as the
data they are fed. What happens when this data has deliberately been
corrupted?128 When was the data created? How can users be sure that the data
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is free of bias? Will certain groups of people be unevenly affected by the data?
These questions are among the many that scholars, governments, and private
corporations continue to ponder in light of increasing algorithmic decisionmaking. The importance of such questions stems from the need to use reliable
and sufficient data for fair and equitable practices.
While some predictive policing programs have been explored and tested, the
majority have not been rigorously scrutinized to warrant their everyday, realworld use. The minimal testing and evaluation of predictive policing tools remain
impediments to predictive policing’s growth and evolution. 129 Many predictive
tools are too novel for evaluative reports to exist.130 Scholars characterize
existing studies as inconclusive, ultimately suggesting it is simply ‘‘too early to
say if [predictive policing] does lead to more effective policing.” 131
Predictive policing tools typically amass older, raw data to produce their
algorithmic predictions. As these data often include previous crime data, they are
‘‘necessarily limited by what individuals choose to report and what law
enforcement officers directly observe.” 132 For example, some police
departments may have a reporting record replete with certain minority groups,
while other records may exhibit a history of inaccurate or insufficient reporting,
broadly understood. Predictive tools will thus deliver varying kinds and types of
predictions.
Absent any processes to confirm that data is not biased, flawed, or
fragmented, predictive tools merely perpetuate pre-existing issues. In part, these
issues are perpetuated because of how much more efficient AI and algorithms are
than general human analysis. The more bad data, the more inherently biased,
inaccurate, and unreliable results.133 Consider the following illustration. Where a
police department’s predictive tools rely on data from over-policed geographic
areas filled with minorities, algorithms will likely point to the same areas
suggesting further police presence. The algorithm’s predictions may even increase
the likelihood of recidivism in the same areas.134 In these instances, ‘‘predictive
policing itself affects the data collected.”135 That is, the criminal activity officers
129

130
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are led to will be used as subsequent crime data fed into the algorithm.136 The
cycle then continues again and again.
The more algorithmic predictions are used, the more data is needed. Scholars
have explored the possibility of police data being ‘‘bad” for a number of reasons
beyond common threats like racial bias. For example, bad data ‘‘includes flaws,
fragmentation, and the internal and external pressures to collect vast amounts of
data.”137 These data may involve human error as a product of officers incorrectly
inputting information such as home addresses.138 Another example is ‘‘dirty”
data ‘‘derived from or influenced by corrupt, biased, and unlawful practices,
including data that has been intentionally manipulated.” 139 Such data is
sometimes a result of work pressures facilitated by managers, as they seek
certain analyses, crime report data, and outcomes.140 These issues beg the
question of whether police would in fact increase their surveillance efforts to
gather, store, and analyze more data through their new predictive algorithms.
Overreaching data-gathering efforts can be problematic because insufficient or
unnecessary means may be used to acquire the data and satisfy required
benchmarks.
Safeguards are needed to protect individuals from predictions based on
subpar data. In some jurisdictions, protections against bad data in respect of
algorithmic decision-making have already been administered. 141 The UK’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides that ‘‘a data subject shall
have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
individuals or similarly significantly affects them.”142 In the predictive policing
context, this protection may enable officers to use their discretion rather than
strictly follow what the predictive programs recommend. Canadian legislation
135
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protecting citizens from bad data may be warranted when predictive policing
becomes heavily reliant on algorithmic decision-making.
In 2019, Canada adopted its Directive on Automated Decision-Making. 143
The Directive was formulated to ensure that state decisions made with
algorithms are ‘‘compatible with core administrative law principles such as
transparency, accountability, legality, and procedural fairness.” 144 One of its
core functions is to ensure emerging technologies are also captured by its
guidelines. In brief, the Directive provides a number of requirements that must
be met when using algorithms for decision-making. Requirements range from
‘‘providing a meaningful explanation to affected individuals of how and why the
decision was made”145 to issues concerning data quality, where ‘‘the automated
decision system [must be] relevant, accurate, [and] up-to-date.”146 Other elements
such as up-to-date information may conflict with some older data used for
predictive policing. Given that both predictive policing and the Directive are in
their infancy, their interplay has yet to be observed.
The reliability of predictive policing in respect of algorithmic decisionmaking will vary from one police department to the next depending on historic
police practices. If a police department is already relying on flawed data to make
conventional human-generated predictions, these practices will necessarily
heighten existing flaws. Indeed, police departments are not in the business of
creating additional issues for their already difficult work. When further
considering algorithmic capabilities, one could argue that the efficiency tied to
algorithms — and in this case with the ability to help prevent criminal activity —
may outweigh the prejudicial implications attached. In addition, some indicate
that using algorithms precludes individual human biases. 147 Nevertheless,
safeguards are important in guaranteeing that individuals affected by
algorithmic predictions, particularly in the criminal justice system, understand
what goes on behind the scenes to establish such predictions.

4. ALGORITHMIC PREDICTIONS AND THE ENTRAPMENT
DOCTRINE
Having explored the contours of entrapment law and complexities of
predictive policing, the paper now turns to whether and how predictive policing
fits into the Canadian entrapment doctrine. This section is separated in four
parts. Part one discusses subjective predispositions and how these are affected by
143
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predictive policing. Second, changes are recommended concerning judicial
assessments of reasonable suspicions and bona fide. The third part touches on
possible issues for suspected and accused persons, including with respect to the
presumption of innocence. Finally, the section concludes with remarks on
obstacles for both Crown and defence counsel, particularly regarding disclosure.

4.1 Doctrinal Modification: Subjective Predispositions
Subjective predispositions of the offender do not justify bringing entrapment
allegations. Recall that unlike US entrapment law, predispositions in Canadian
criminal law are not used to assess whether police officers have appropriate
reasonable suspicions. Predispositions merely become factors that affect police’s
gathering of a reasonable suspicion and are ultimately not sufficient on their
own.148 As Chief Justice Lamer and Justice Major clarified in R. v. Pearson,149
predisposition is not the focus of entrapment; instead, entrapment is concerned
with whether ‘‘guilt was uncovered in a manner that shocks the conscience and
offends the principle of decency and fair play.”150
To prevent police from over-focusing on recidivists when establishing
reasonable suspicions, courts should be more cautious when dealing with
subjective predispositions. As noted in an earlier section, predictive policing can
potentially enable cycling back to previous offenders. Subjective predispositions
would therefore be crucial and significant when reaching the reasonable (virtual)
suspicion threshold. In simple terms, predictions, if amounting to reasonable
suspicions, will unfortunately heavily rely on past criminal records and
individuals with a propensity to commit a criminal offence. They will rely on
subjective predispositions. It is thus reasonable to suggest that predisposition
dominates the reasonable suspicion equation when dealing with algorithmic
predictions.
Given the inherent weight of predisposition that pulls technological
predictions in certain directions, it is also reasonable to ask whether Canadian
entrapment law would instead be following a subjective approach when rooted in
predictive policing algorithms. Indeed, the subjective approach relies on
individuals’ predisposition to engage in criminal activity. Predictive policing’s
focus and basis on predisposition begs the question of whether an offender, upon
alleging entrapment, bears the burden of proving a lack of predisposition to
counter the given algorithm.151 Taking it one step further, the offender would
have one task: establishing proof — likely on a balance of probabilities given that
the beyond a reasonable doubt threshold would be too high — that the data
showing they were predisposed to commit a crime was incorrect or flawed. Once
148
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the offender has proven lack of predisposition, the burden would likely shift to
the Crown to prove — perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt similar to the US —
that the offender was in fact predisposed. However, the Crown would be armed
with predictive policing data — in addition to other resources — to meet this
burden.
To avoid focusing purely on predisposition, decisions engaging in reasonable
suspicion analysis should not be fully automated. That is, much like Article 22 of
the GDPR noted earlier in this paper, police departments should be required to
use their own judgment when acting on algorithmic predictions. A predictive
policing algorithm should not be immediately resorted to and applied without
further police inquiry. Although this would involve more work for police
departments, it would be a small price to pay to ensure validity, legitimacy, and
accuracy of their predictive tools.
Police officers must therefore maintain some discretion in their line of work.
Assuming full-scale implementation of predictive policing technologies,
questions will surely surface — among legal practitioners and scholars —
regarding whether all algorithmic predictions should be responded to
immediately, or whether some take priority over others. 152 That law
enforcement should automatically respond to and investigate every algorithmic
prediction would vitiate any discretion. The danger in removing police discretion
completely is that:
[d]iscretion is at the root of criminal justice practice. Police officers
necessarily exercise discretion in deciding whether to [. . .] stop and
search or arrest. Some people look less ‘suspicious’ than others, and
possible offences have to be prioritized. [. . .] Similarly, when officers
are able to be proactive (as compared to their usual reactive mode) they
have to use discretion about the offences or offenders in which to invest
scarce time.153

Officers ought to use their discretionary powers to embark on investigations
and act on algorithms prior to presenting opportunities to commit crimes. Of
course, it may be difficult for officers to strike a balance between deference to the
algorithms and their own discretion. It is worth questioning why algorithms
would be used in the first place if law enforcement would still have overruling
authority. In using their discretion, officers should also be expected to provide
clear reasons for prioritizing one prediction over the other or ignoring some
altogether. Ultimately, police discretionary power should remain intact as an

152

153

In and of itself, the prospect of departments prioritizing some algorithmic predictions
over others may open the door to civil liability if certain predictions should have been
(but were not) acted upon. Indeed, civil liability in this respect falls beyond the
boundaries of this paper.
Andrew Sanders & Richard Young, ‘‘From Suspect to Trial” in Mike Maguire, Rod
Morgan, & Robert Reiner, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 5th ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012) 838 at 842.

278 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[18 C.J.L.T.]

important policing tool, but law enforcement should be ready to provide grounds
for its decision-making in respect of responding to predictions. 154
Due to the issue of possibly inaccurate predictions, Parliament should
require officers to embark on a reasonable risk minimization analysis before
acting on a virtual prediction. Indeed, police have long since become risk and
knowledge workers.155 Law enforcement is expected to eliminate or diminish risk
when investigating criminal activity, as risk management ‘‘is one of the most
important components in law enforcement and public safety, both in the daily
administrative mayhem and operational duties.”156 As such, requiring officers to
minimize risk in the course of their investigations would be paramount. If police
simply act on every prediction the algorithm provides, many people subject to the
predictions may be incorrectly targeted. Enacting legislation to have officers
engage in risk minimization analysis would be a start. Therefore, courts would
ultimately need to be satisfied that police officers have engaged in risk
minimization so as not to allow each and every prediction — heavily reliant
on predisposition — to be acted upon.

4.2 Doctrinal Modification: Reasonable Suspicions and Bona Fide Inquiries
Provided police departments engage in minimizing the inherent risks in
assessing predisposition, questions of reasonable suspicion and bona fide
inquiries must be unpacked. This paper argues for the modification of the
current entrapment doctrine and the minimization of risk. Modification is
necessary to maintain police accountability in the investigative process. If police
departments find predictive policing more accurate and efficient, then the police
ought to be more accurate and precise in their investigations relying on predictive
policing. Further accuracy and precision would ensure that as policing tools
advance and develop, police accountability also follows. In other words, police
precision and accuracy leads to more precise and accurate predictions as the
algorithms develop.
In Mack,157 Justice Lamer stated that if police had sufficient information to
suggest that criminal activity was occurring in a given area, any individual in the
area could be provided the opportunity to commit said criminal offence. He
provided an example, saying that if police receive a number of complaints of
theft at a bus terminal, causing them to investigate pursuant to a bona fide
154
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inquiry, they could place a handbag in the middle of the terminal. Upon seeing
someone take the handbag, they could arrest the individual without engaging in
entrapment. Despite law enforcement providing an opportunity to anyone in the
area to commit a crime, they circumvent the strictures of entrapment because of
the bona fide inquiry.
Where police use predictive policing in similar circumstances to the example
provided in Mack, Justice Lamer would likely permit police presenting similar
opportunities to anyone in the given area. Indeed, his ruling in the predictive
policing context would be viewed in a similar light to ordinary police data
producing a bona fide inquiry. The difference would be the efficiency predictive
policing offers. As such, Justice Lamer would likely allow predictive policing in
this context, but he would surely question whether the data used for prediction
were sufficient, valid, and reliable, as well as how they are authenticated by
police.
This paper proposes that police need to be sufficiently precise when
investigating criminal activity and presenting opportunities to commit an
offence. The concept of using predictive policing to develop a reasonable
suspicion or investigate pursuant to a bona fide inquiry suggests that such
technology must be more scrupulous for investigations. If the tool is more
efficient and accurate, the general Canadian public would likely call for more
accuracy and precision in police investigations reliant on predictive policing. Not
only would more accuracy and precision be fruitful for community-police
relations, but the use of more accurate technology warrants more exact
investigations to justify the tools’ use.
Not requiring greater precision would lead to an increase in police power
without a similar increase in police accountability. In the bus terminal example in
Mack, this would mean anyone in the vicinity would still be subject to the
presentation of an opportunity to commit a crime, albeit without ensuring that
predictive policing is not being abused. In other words, predictive policing being
more accurate necessitates further precision when police engage certain
individuals rather than merely being able to ‘‘test” anyone who is present in a
given area.158 Perhaps in a case more similar in its facts to Barnes where the
Court opposed investigations being grounded in subjective hunches, a six-block
radius would be too wide, ultimately requiring a narrower approach when using
predictive policing tools. Therefore, both reasonable suspicions and
investigations pursuant to bona fide inquiries would require police to be more
precise when deciding how opportunities are presented and to whom.
If the notion that any persons present in an area may be subject to criminal
opportunity is removed from the entrapment doctrine, random virtue-testing
would be bypassed. Random virtue-testing refers to incriminating individuals
158
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based on mere police hunches rather than being grounded in reasonable
suspicions or bona fide inquiries.159 In Barnes, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the police did not entrap the offender given the existing reasonable
suspicion on which their investigation was based; any individual present in the
area was subject to opportunities to commit a crime. Some have argued that the
case of Ahmad involved some form of random virtue-testing. In that case, police
operated on uncorroborated tips and ultimately called related phone numbers,
arranged to meet the individuals, and purchased drugs from them prior to
executing the arrests. Restricting the scope of a suspected area and the
individuals with whom police may engage would guarantee that random
virtue-testing is significantly diminished.
Avoiding random virtue-testing would do much to prevent discriminatory
practices. As noted earlier, predictive policing may keep police investigations
hovered over certain areas. These areas may predominantly be home to people
from particular socio-demographic groups. If officers are constantly instructed
— by virtual suspicions — to return to such areas, typical reasonable suspicions
and investigations pursuant to bona fide inquiries would likely amount to greater
chances of recidivism. That is, police officers recognizing previous offenders may
alert them, when they arrive in a given area, to present said persons with criminal
opportunities because of the individual’s association with criminal conduct. As
such, further precision and accuracy of the geographic area or individual persons
being investigated would avoid these discriminatory practices.
In short, further precision of reasonable suspicions and investigations
pursuant to bona fide inquiries circumvent random virtue-testing. Presumably,
police departments would not fully implement predictive policing programs until
ensuring some accuracy. If police considerably rely on predictive policing tools to
meet their investigatory thresholds and also engage in risk minimization, there
would be no need to worry about random-virtue testing. The police would have
ultimately minimized risk, used more precise and accurate predictions, and
ensured ‘‘[a] nexus [. . .] between the criminal conduct [. . .] and the investigative
technique employed.”160 If each of the opportunities offered by police are
grounded in these thresholds, law enforcement would necessarily avoid any
random virtue-testing.

4.3 Implications for the Suspected, Accused, and Crown and Defence
Counsel
Implementing a new, more efficient and accurate policing tool obviously
increases the state’s power to investigate. These tools support police’s use of
resources beyond the general public’s reach. As a result, the data used and
collected impacts the lives of Canadians. Ultimately, using these tools risks legal
implications for suspects with whom predictive policing tools engage. Legal
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implications also exist for suspects who become accused persons following arrest,
demonstrating the interplay between predictive policing tools and the criminal
justice process.
This section explores some arising ramifications for both suspects and
accused persons when predictive policing technologies are adopted. The section
does not purport to establish a comprehensive list of effects that suspects and
accused persons may experience. However, it does offer some insight into
questions that would be necessary to address in the predictive policing landscape.
The highlighted issues range from being ‘‘selected” by an algorithm to alleging
entrapment. Particularly, it explores the presumption of innocence and disclosure
issues.
Offenders may run into a host of issues when alleging entrapment, one of
which involves the presumption of innocence. For years, the presumption of
innocence has been ‘‘a foundational principle of the modern criminal justice
system.”161 The rule ensures that only those whose offences have been proven by
the state to reach a legal threshold — beyond a reasonable doubt — are
considered guilty. In the event that a judge or jury finds that the Crown has met
its burden and secured a conviction, a punishment may be imposed. 162 Until
then, the presumption of innocence is in full force, and its protection is crucial
because of strong measures such as punishment; the fragility of fact-finding at
trials; the maintenance of proper relationships between the state and citizens; and
standards of proof.163 However, the presumption is not limited to the trial
context; it also applies to pre-trial circumstances when considering its
‘‘reputation-related aspect,”164 its moral value,165 and its protection against
arbitrary state conduct.166
In the entrapment context, predictive policing could produce deleterious
effects for the presumption of innocence. Given the surveillance practices rooted
in predictive policing algorithms, these effects are engendered due to the possible
shift of legal burden. Recall that beyond conventional policing records and
statistics, emerging technologies — including in smart cities — can assist the
substance of predictions. The use of these technologies in criminal proceedings
161
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can often redirect the burden of proof ‘‘from the claimant to the accused or
suspected”167 to challenge issues with the technologies. If burdens shift to the
accused, there will be additional onuses on the accused to prove that they should
not have been subject to algorithmic predictions.168 In addition, predictive
policing tools can help develop the police’s belief that any individual may be
perceived as the ‘‘bad man,”169 thereby calling the presumption of innocence into
question far before the court process. In other words, an algorithm’s accurate
prediction may result in individuals being treated as already guilty on moral (not
legal) grounds.
On the other hand, predictive policing for entrapment purposes may be able
to assist non-suspected and non-accused persons. If predictive policing
algorithms are precise enough to determine who may be subject to reasonable
suspicions, they will also guarantee that others should not be subject to similar
suspicions. While some suggest smart technologies will create a culture of
suspicion,170 the same technology also ‘‘enables the innocent to be rapidly
eliminated from enquiries.”171 When formulating reasonable suspicions about
particular individuals, police will theoretically be able to distinguish certain
individuals and avoid investigating others. The prospect of narrowing an
investigation toward one individual — whether by way of reasonable suspicion
or bona fide inquiry — will logically enable technologies to identify those who
should not be subject to investigation.
Following conviction, however, offenders are responsible for proving
entrapment. At its core, entrapment is a defence against conviction, but it
differs from traditional defences in ways mentioned earlier in this paper.
Offenders must nevertheless prove that one of the entrapment branches have
been met, and in doing so they engage their Charter right to make full answer
and defence. The right to make full answer and defence is a significantly complex
right that encompasses sections 10 and 11 of the Charter and is also a principle of
fundamental justice.172 Beyond the possibility of accused persons having further
burdens following predictive policing’s implementation, it would become
increasingly challenging to allege entrapment when reasonable suspicions or
bona fide inquiries are based on algorithms.
The major obstacle offenders and their counsel face is that of disclosure, and
Crown counsel may also struggle with the same concept. Governed by the
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ordinary rules of evidence at trial, entrapment hearings follow similar statutory
and common law principles in respect of evidence. The Canadian common law
disclosure rule holds that, upon prosecuting an individual, the Crown has a duty
to disclose all information that is likely relevant to the case at bar. 173 Here, the
Crown can ‘‘resist disclosure by establishing clear irrelevance.”174 Disclosure,
which must occur prior to the accused’s election of trial,175 is an ongoing Crown
duty and a defendant’s right ‘‘whether or not it is favourable to the accused
person.”176
For disclosure purposes, the Supreme Court of Canada has established that
police departments are separate from the Crown. The Crown is faced with
disclosure obligations while the police are not held to the same standards.
However, the separation does not preclude police from withholding certain
information. In R. v. McNeil,177 Justice Charron, writing for the majority,
insisted that it is common knowledge ‘‘that the police have a corollary duty to
disclose to the prosecuting Crown all material pertaining to the investigation of
an accused.”178 The Court reminds us that the Crown has a duty to inquire
further if it becomes aware of relevant information. 179
With a focus on entrapment, algorithms informing reasonable suspicions or
bona fide inquiries present a difficult puzzle to solve for the Crown, and this can
affect the defence’s ability to make full answer and defence. Evidently, predictive
policing algorithms are part of the police investigation and are relevant to cases
relying on them. As part of their corollary duty, the police are therefore required
to disclose the information. The duty then rests on the Crown to disclose this
relevant information to defence counsel.
A question then remains unanswered: exactly what information must the
Crown disclose? Is the Crown required to share the inner workings of the
algorithm? The data on which the algorithm’s prediction is based? To further
complicate things, third-party companies usually own and maintain the
technology itself, and the inner workings of the technology and how it works
is proprietary for, inter alia, intellectual property purposes.180 Given that
173

174
175

176

177
178
179

See R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 CarswellAlta 559, 1991 CarswellAlta 192, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
326 (S.C.C.). If the information is sought by the defendant, and the defendant has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, the O’Connor and Mills regimes
govern production: see David M Paciocco, ‘‘Filling the Seam Between Stinchcombe and
O’Connor: The ‘‘McNeil” Disclosure Application” (2007) 53 Crim LQ 161.
Paciocco, ibid at 163.
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companies ‘‘are frequently unwilling to disclose the formula [. . .] on which their
tools are based,”181 it is reasonable to question the precise nature of the Crown’s
duty in such circumstances.
Determining what information is required in order for defence counsel to
offer a full answer and defence becomes difficult. Algorithms are highly
sophisticated in nature and are not very well understood by non-experts. Such
complications and minimal understanding of the technology may even present
problems for other legal actors given that:
[I]f a police officer, magistrate judge, or the public does not have access
to how the predictions are made, there is no check on the legitimacy of
the factors used. Nor is there a way to ascertain whether further
decisions that relies on those circumstances [. . .] were legally
reached.182

In the event that the algorithms remain observed through technological
jargon, defence counsel’s ability to argue entrapment — and the other officers of
the court’s understanding of the matter — is surely hindered.
At first glance, the next reasonable step would be to disclose the algorithm’s
workings using ordinary language. Conveying the information so as to make it
accessible would enable parties of the court to better understand the algorithms.
However, access to the mechanics of the algorithm would likely threaten law
enforcement’s work. Suppose an algorithm gathered a reasonable suspicion on a
particular individual who was in the midst of terrorist activity. If the way in
which the algorithm predicted such activity was disclosed to the public, police
investigations would be vulnerable. To prevent such disclosure, police may have
to argue that the information is privileged and therefore should not be disclosed.
Complications with disclosure in these circumstances extends to those who
are subject to predictive policing algorithms. Recall that Canada’s Directive
regarding automated decision-making requires that individuals are informed of
how decisions were made with some sort of transparency. The Directive allows
Canadians to understand the reasons for which they are subject to algorithmic
decision-making in line with administrative principles. Beyond a court of law,
then, individuals have the right to request such information. Therefore, access to
this information — for our purposes, information governing the algorithm — is
of utmost importance when an individual is prosecuted by the state.
A final issue involves whether the predictive policing programs should simply
be accepted as authoritative and valid. In other words, defence counsel may
benefit from being able to use the data on which the charge was based and call
experts to test validity, methodology, and more. If permitted, defence counsel
180
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may even be able to consult with experts to build their own analysis based off the
data and measure whether the expert’s model(s) is more accurate and valid than
the predictive policing’s algorithm.
How the Crown provides this information to offenders is one concern that, if
approached satisfactorily, can make the process fairer and more transparent. A
government-mandated independent oversight body for predictive policing tools
is a start. Predictive policing will surely evolve with new ways of informing
predictions, and one way to maintain accountability is through an oversight
body to ensure data is being used objectively, is valid, and is up to date. An
oversight body would assist offenders in understanding the algorithm’s
legitimacy, but it would also enable law enforcement to conduct their
investigations without fear of repercussions for insufficient or problematic
data. Presumably, such an entity would consist of experts in artificial intelligence
and algorithms. Although it would not fully address disclosure issues, an
oversight body is a first step for all officers of the court and provides
transparency for judges to ‘‘determine whether or not an officer’s reliance on that
information was reasonable.”183 Perhaps the implantation of such a body would
help maintain automated data analysis’ ‘‘promises to make [. . .] institutional
decision-making more objective, consistent, and rigorous.”184

5. CONCLUSION
The landscape of technology in North America is constantly evolving and
continues to present new challenges to existing legal doctrines and principles.
Gone are the days where technological apparatuses were restricted to common
functions (e.g. simple mathematical calculations) that simply expedited human
processes and practices. AI and algorithms instead offer new ways to analyze
data, perform tasks, and undertake processes of which humans are incapable. 185
They have taken on a number of human practices and functions to promote
expeditious and nuanced analyses, while also performing other operations.
Indeed, artificial intelligence and algorithms are able to do something humans
have desired and questioned for many years: predict phenomena. Coupled with
the ability to predict, however, are the rights and freedoms of individuals that
ought to be addressed.
A number of Canadian judicial decisions accept the maxim that as
technology continues to evolve, so too must the law. Most pertinent to this
belief are cases that involve communications between different technologies 186 or
police retrieving certain information by searching and seizing such
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technologies.187 Although the law is developing in these areas, a number of legal
issues have not yet been considered in light of sophisticated technology. This
paper suggests that the entrapment doctrine ought to be modified in light of
predictive policing’s growth in the criminal justice system. Given predictive
policing’s ability to previse criminal activity using historic and current data, the
entrapment doctrine developed in Mack should be revisited.
A few qualifications are needed to avoid negative repercussions for a number
of stakeholders in the entrapment context. These provisos are mere suggestions
as to how Canadian courts can tackle questions of entrapment when they are
based on predictive policing. First, police should follow the Government of
Canada’s Directive on Automated Decision-Making strictly and ensure that
decisions are not made purely by predictive policing tools. In order to fulfil this
task, police must maintain their discretion when responding to predictive
policing’s directions regarding investigatory steps.
Second, when predictive policing is used to develop reasonable suspicions or
investigate pursuant to bona fide inquiries, precision and accuracy are key
elements to maintaining police accountability. These are also important in the
digital world as illustrated in Ahmad, where the Supreme Court — referring to
the use of technology in entrapment generally — held that ‘‘the virtual space in
question must be defined with sufficient precision in order to ground reasonable
suspicion.”188 Police departments using more accurate tools (i.e. predictive
policing) to discern locations or individuals in respect of criminal activity should
be held to a higher standard when making their determinations. The more
accurate and precise the investigating police officers are, the less likely a court
will be to find that random virtue-testing occurred.
Finally, implications for the suspected, accused, or counsel for both sides
must be addressed by the courts. Here, questions arise regarding the presumption
of innocence and whether the legal burden shifts onto the accused, as well as
whether officers begin to presume those who are subject to predictive policing
algorithms as guilty. Nevertheless, the more accurate a prediction, the more
precise and believable the circumvention of other, non-accused and nonsuspected persons. Difficulties also arise for defence and Crown counsel. As for
defence counsel, issues with respect to disclosure and how the algorithmic
information is conveyed may be one concern. With defence counsel requiring
such specific information to make full answer and defence for an accused, Crown
counsel is obliged to disclose this relevant information. The difficulties that come
with Crown (and even police to Crown counsel) disclosure arise for two reasons.
First, the technology that is used for predictive policing is typically proprietary,
and its inner workings ought not to be disclosed for competition purposes.
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Second, disclosing how police sift through these covert technological
investigations would threaten police powers and their ability to conduct law
enforcement duties effectively.

